This review ends where its problem is oldest. The whole of this work concerns one party taking another's word and acting on it, and that is the founding question of a branch of philosophy: the epistemology of testimony, which asks how we come to know things on the strength of what we are told. It is worth naming the lineage, briefly, and then stepping back to the engineering, because the point of touching philosophy here is to locate the problem, not to solve philosophy.
Two ideas from that field are enough. The first is a long-running debate between a transmission view of testimony and a generation view. On the transmission view, testimony can only pass along knowledge the speaker already has; a hearer cannot come to know, through being told, something the speaker did not know. On the generation view, testimony can do more, and a hearer can end up with a justified belief even in cases where the speaker's own evidence did not justify the speaker (Leonard, 2021). Stated plainly, this is a debate about whether the authority of a claim can grow as it crosses from one person to another. That crossing is the boundary this work exists to guard.
The second idea is the field's own illustration of exactly the failure this work names. In the standard example, a person is told by a doctor that their eyesight is currently unreliable, then sees something, and tells a friend what they saw. The friend can be justified in believing it on their say-so, even though the speaker's own total evidence, including the doctor's warning, did not justify the speaker in believing it at all. The belief arrives at the receiver carrying more warrant than it had at its source. That is the promotion of a claim's authority beyond its basis, occurring at a handover, described in philosophy's own terms decades before the machines that would industrialize it.
And here is the small, genuine observation to take from the detour. Philosophy has studied this boundary for a very long time, and it has a rich vocabulary for how trust passes from speaker to hearer. But it has no settled name for the elevation itself, for the specific event in which a claim comes to be held as more established than its basis warrants. This work supplies that name, and then departs from philosophy entirely. The epistemologist asks whether the hearer is justified. This work asks something narrower and mechanical: whether a system can carry a claim's basis across the boundary, so that the unwarranted elevation can be refused by the interface rather than left to the judgement of whoever, or whatever, receives it. The philosophy locates the problem. The engineering is what follows.
References
Leonard, N. (2021). Epistemological Problems of Testimony. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob